Judicial Panel Selection and Strategic Behavior of Chief Justices of India
Judicial panel selection and strategic behaviour in the Indian Supreme Court: Measuring the performance of Chief Justices
GPT Abstract Summary
Chief Justices of India have distinctive administrative powers, including the authority to constitute judicial panels to hear cases. An analysis of 20 years of data finds that, as retirement approaches, they act strategically by convening panels favorable to the government and showing a pro-government tendency in their rulings. Similar patterns are observed among chief justices in jurisdictions such as Canada and South Africa, and these judges are also more likely to obtain government positions after retirement. The study suggests that the power to select judicial panels is too consequential to be concentrated in one office holder.
Key Points
- Chief Justices of India strategically use their panel-selection powers to constitute panels favorable to government rulings before retirement.
- Their behavior resembles that of chief justices in jurisdictions such as Canada and South Africa, and they are more likely to obtain government positions after retirement.
Scope and Limitations of the Summary
This English translation is based on a Korean summary generated from the source abstract. It is not a review of the full paper. Consult the original for detailed methods, figures and the scope of the conclusions.
This summary is based solely on the abstract of the paper and does not include detailed research methods, data specifics, statistical verification, or limitations.
This summary does not represent the official views of Professor Haksoo Ko or the Center for Law & Economics at Seoul National University.
Summary Basis: Original Abstract · Model: gpt-4.1-mini · Generated: 2026. 10. 02. 01:59 (Korean Standard Time)