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Latest Research Briefings

Get Closer to New Research in Law and Economics.
Discover papers from Korean and international journals, read abstract-based summaries, and follow links to the original papers.

DAILY READING06:00Daily at 6 a.m. (KST)40 papers · 8 summaries

Displaying newest research first based on publication date.
‘Domestic’ refers to papers published in Korean journals; it does not indicate the authors’ nationality.

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Total 40 Papers

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01International Journal
The Journal of Law, Economics, and OrganizationSummary

Why the Prohibition of Non-Compete Agreements Does Not Lead to an Increase in Trade Secret Litigation

Can you keep a secret? Banning noncompetes does not increase trade secret litigation

Brad N Greenwood · Bruce H Kobayashi · Evan P Starr

This study examined the conventional wisdom that banning non-compete agreements (NCA) increases labor mobility and thus trade secret infringement litigation. By analyzing state-level data on NCA bans for high-wage and low-wage workers and trade secret litigation data from Westlaw and Courthouse News Service, it was found that, in the long term, trade secret lawsuits decrease. This decline is not due to decreases in cases where NCA and trade secret claims are simultaneously filed or weakened reliance on trade secrets; companies rather rely more on trade secret protections after NCA prohibitions. Furthermore, the introduction of the inevitable disclosure doctrine leads to increases in both NCA and trade secret litigation, suggesting the two protection measures are complementary.

law and economicsData Economy
Summary and bibliographic information Original Text · DOI
02International Journal
The Journal of Law, Economics, and OrganizationSummary

A Study on Conflicts of Interest, Ethical Standards, and Competition in Legal Services

Conflicts of interest, ethical standards, and competition in legal services†

Jan Bouckaert · Johan Stennek

This study examines how representative conflicts of interest are managed within the legal profession. Conflicts of interest arise when one law firm represents clients with opposing interests, potentially harming legal procedures and social welfare. The researcher points out that the disqualification approach emphasized by current ethical standards may actually be detrimental to clients. Instead, client interest protection mainly stems from law firms being kept small to reduce the incidence of conflicts of interest. Despite low market concentration, law firms enjoy high profits due to negative network externalities caused by conflicts of interest, which are sustainably maintained in the long term as long as new entries through firm splits continue.

law and economics
Summary and bibliographic information Original Text · DOI
03International Journal
The Journal of Law, Economics, and OrganizationSummary

The Importance of Compensation for Research Failures and Information Disclosure

Rewarding failure

Alice Guerra · Francesco Parisi · Andres Sawicki

Research activities are processes with a high possibility of failure and incompletion. Successful research is rewarded economically through intellectual property rights, but failed research investments are regarded merely as losses. However, failed research also creates valuable information that increases the success probability of subsequent research. Socially, it is desirable for companies to disclose failure information to prevent duplicated failures. However, the current legal system does not provide effective methods to capture and share the value of information created by failed research. This paper analyzes problems of the current unilateral compensation system through a simple stage model and examines various legal and institutional solutions such as informal bankruptcy procedures, patent-like property rights, and prize systems to seek ways to align private and social research incentives.

law and economics
Summary and bibliographic information Open Access Full Text · DOI
04International Journal
The Journal of Law, Economics, and OrganizationSummary

Analysis of the Impact of Mandatory Minimum Sentencing

How much do mandatory minimums matter?

Spencer Cooper

Mandatory Minimum Sentencing (MM) has been identified as a major cause of long-term sentences among federal drug offenders. However, prosecutorial discretion in the indictment process makes it difficult to precisely measure the causal effect of MM. The study shows that prosecutors tend to select racial minority defendants as subject to MM more than white defendants, which leads to biased results in simple analyses. Using regression discontinuity design and extrapolation methods to separate legislative effects from prosecutorial selection effects, the results indicate that MM increases sentence length by approximately 10 months (14%) without evidence of racially differential effects. Thus, racial disparities are suggested to arise from prosecutorial charging decisions rather than the statutory provisions themselves.

law and economics
Summary and bibliographic information Original Text · DOI Open Access Full Text
05International Journal
The Journal of Law, Economics, and OrganizationSummary

The Effects of Contingent Plea Agreements for Witness Testimony

Contingent plea agreements for witness testimony

Frances Xu Lee · Abraham L Wickelgren

Using a Bayesian jury model, this study examines contingent plea agreements under which a prosecutor offers leniency to an eyewitness conditional on a successful conviction. It considers concerns about perjury and cases in which courts have excluded testimony obtained through such agreements. The effects on Type 1 errors (convicting innocent defendants) and Type 2 errors (acquitting guilty defendants) depend on the precision of additional trial evidence. When that evidence is highly precise, allowing contingency may reduce both errors. A properly designed limit on leniency can also allow both errors to decrease.

law and economics
Summary and bibliographic information Original Text · DOI
06International Journal
International Review of Law and EconomicsSummary

Judicial Panel Selection and Strategic Behavior of Chief Justices of India

Judicial panel selection and strategic behaviour in the Indian Supreme Court: Measuring the performance of Chief Justices

Madhav S. Aney · Shubhankar Dam · Giovanni Ko et al. 1 Authors

Chief Justices of India have distinctive administrative powers, including the authority to constitute judicial panels to hear cases. An analysis of 20 years of data finds that, as retirement approaches, they act strategically by convening panels favorable to the government and showing a pro-government tendency in their rulings. Similar patterns are observed among chief justices in jurisdictions such as Canada and South Africa, and these judges are also more likely to obtain government positions after retirement. The study suggests that the power to select judicial panels is too consequential to be concentrated in one office holder.

law and economics
Summary and bibliographic information Open Access Full Text · DOI
12Domestic Academic Journals
Korean Journal of Law and EconomicsSummary

An Econometric Empirical Analysis of the Wage Characteristics of Managerial Performance Bonuses

Economic Considerations on the Wage Nature of Managerial Performance Bonuses

Ji Eun Lee · Chaehyun Kim · Heonjae Song

This study analyzed whether managerial performance bonuses are recognized as labor costs in firms' employment decisions using panel survey data of enterprises. The presence or payment of performance bonuses showed no significant relationship with overall employment or employment excluding executives, and a partial positive relationship was confirmed only in regular employment. The results of analyses on non-regular workers and large-scale business establishments were also consistent, suggesting that managerial performance bonuses are more likely utilized as a means of maintaining and managing regular employees rather than as labor costs. This study provides empirical evidence regarding the wage characteristics of managerial performance bonuses.

law and economics
Summary and bibliographic information Original Text · DOI
13Domestic Academic Journals
Korean Journal of Law and EconomicsSummary

A Law and Economics Examination of the Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty and Problems in Statistical Empirical Analysis

The Law and Economics Perspective on the Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty

Haksoo Ko · Haebin Jeong

Empirical analyses of the death penalty's deterrent effect produce complex and conflicting results, necessitating deeper law and economics discussions. This paper explores the fundamental difficulties in deterrence research focusing on epistemological limits in causal inference and rational choice theory application as well as contextual changes according to social science analytical dimensions. It also distinguishes solvable problems and fundamental challenges and suggests a research agenda for domestic studies.

law and economics
Summary and bibliographic information Original Text · DOI
Inclusion Criteria and Abstract Information

Law and economics and related studies are collected from publicly available academic metadata from Crossref and OpenAlex. 'Domestic' is classified by domestic academic journal standards. Some papers or abstracts may not be available depending on the update timing and the scope of information provided by each source.

If only the month or year of publication is disclosed, it is displayed up to that range. Records without verifiable dates are placed at the end of the list. Links to full texts are addresses provided by the source, and actual access conditions can be confirmed with the respective providers.

‘GPT Abstract Summary’ is displayed only when generated based on the original abstract. Generated summaries are not shown for papers that have only bibliographic information. Summaries do not substitute for full texts and do not represent the official views of Professor Haksoo Ko or the Seoul National University Center for Law & Economics.

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